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Denial of service (DoS) attack is a major class of security threats today. They consume resources of remote hosts or network and
make them deny or degrade services for legitimate users. Compared with traditional Internet, the resources, such as bandwidth,
memory, and battery power, of each node are more limited in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Therefore, nodes in MANETs
are more vulnerable to DoS attacks. Moreover, attackers in MANETs cannot only use IP spoofing to conceal their real identities
but also move arbitrarily, which makes it a challenging task to trace a remote attacker in MANETs. In this paper, we proposed a
zone sampling-based traceback (ZSBT) algorithm for tracing DoS attackers in MANETs. In our algorithm, when a node forwards
a packet, the node writes its zone ID into the packet with a probability. After receiving these packets, the victim can reconstruct
the path between the attacker and itself. Simulations were carried out to illustrate the validity of the algorithm; even with a little
communication overhead.
Copyright © 2006 Xin Jin et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

1.

INTRODUCTION

A MANET is a collection of mobile nodes that establish communication paths dynamically. Nodes may join a network
at any time and communicate with the entire network via
neighboring nodes. In recent years, with the rapid deployment of MANET applications, securities become one of the
major problems in MANET today. MANETs are much more
vulnerable to various kinds of attacks [1] than wired networks due to their characteristics, such as the volatile network topologies, dependence on collective participation of
all nodes, and the limited bandwidth and battery power of
nodes.
Attacks against MANETs can be classified into two categories: passive attacks and active attacks. Passive attacks typically involve eavesdropping of data. Active attacks involve actions such as replication, modification, and deletion of exchanged data or DoS attacks. This kind of attacks always
target at congestion, propagating incorrect routing information, preventing services from working properly, or stopping
them completely.
DoS attacks by an unintentional failure or malicious
action are one of the major classes of threats in network
security today. A classical way of DoS attack is to flood
any centralized resources to make them no longer operate correctly or even crash. In MANET, besides the classical way of DoS attack, a more concealed form used in an

open MANET environment is the so-called sleep deprivation torture. In this type of DoS attack, the attacker is trying to deprive a device with limited battery power by sending a large number of legal packets to the victim to keep
it awake and engaged in the communication all the time.
The neighbor nodes of the attacker are diﬃcult to detect this
type of attack by their own intrusion detection system, because both the behavior of the attacker and the packets it
sent are legal. The victim itself may detect the attack very
quickly because it can find that a large number of packets
have no actual operations or the operations do not make
sense.
When a victim detects a DoS attack, a widely used solution is tracing the DoS attack back towards its origin, and
then stopping the attacker at the source. As attackers usually use IP spoofing to conceal their real location, several
IP traceback mechanisms have been proposed for the Internet, such as link testing [2], ingress filtering [3], probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [4], and ICMP traceback (ITrace)
[5], to trace the true sources of attackers. These traceback
approaches cannot be directly applied to MANET due to the
following reasons that are related to two aspects: eﬃciency
and eﬀectivity.
(1) Nodes in MANETs can move arbitrarily, which makes
attack paths change frequently. Therefore, additional constraints are placed on tracing approaches for locating the
attack sources in time. Therefore, the traceback approaches
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used in MANETS should be more eﬀective than that in the
Internet.
(2) Traceback approaches in the Internet always consume a lot of bandwidth, computational resources, and battery power. However, in MANETs, nodes are typically devices
with limited bandwidth, computational resources, and battery power. These limitations require that the traceback approaches in MANETs should be more eﬃcient than that in
the Internet.
Concentrating on how to eﬀectively and eﬃciently trace
remote DoS attackers in MANET environment, we proposed a zone sampling-based traceback (ZSBT) algorithm.
In ZSBT, the network area is divided into several zones and
each node knows its zone ID. When a node receives a packet
to be forwarded, it first writes its zone ID with a probability p
into the packet and then forwards the packet. When it detects
that it is suﬀered from a DoS attack, the victim can reconstruct the entire path by combining a modest number of such
packets. We study the performance of ZSBT algorithm using
GloMoSim [6] simulator with diﬀerent marking probability.
The simulation results have shown the validity of ZSBT.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we discuss the related work. In Section 3, details of the ZSBT
algorithm are presented. In Section 4, we give the performance analysis. Simulation model and simulation results are
provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2.

RELATED WORK

Savage and his colleagues have proposed a probabilistic
packet marking (PPM) approach to reconstruct the path
from a remote attacker to the victim in the Internet [4].
The basic idea behind PPM is the usage of edge sampling.
A packet on the path is marked with a certain probability by
two routers on the way, forming an edge. Each marked packet
then represents a sample of the whole path. The victim receives all packets and can thereby use the marked packet to
reconstruct the entire path back to the source. The number
of data packets, X, required for the victim to reconstruct an
attack path of d hops, has the following bounded expectation:
E(x) <

ln(d)
.
p(1 − p)d−1

packets to reconstruct the paths back to the attackers. An
enhancement to ITrace, known as ITrace-CP (ICMP traceback with cumulative path) [7], was proposed, thereby the
ITrace-CP messages are made to carry the entire attack path
information so as to facilitate a faster attack path construction in the event of DoS attacks. When a router receives an
IP packet, an ITrace-CP message will be generated based on
the probability set by the router. This message is then sent
to the next hop router, instead of the destination address of
the IP packet. In [8], Vrizlynn et al. have proposed an enhanced ITrace-CP to trace attackers in both wired networks
and wireless ad hoc networks. In their approach, they consider distribution of the probability in an exponential manner so that a faster construction time is achievable within
the same overhead constraint. As the PPM approach requires
overloading a field in the IP header, which raises the backward protocol compatibility problem, ITrace/ITrace-CP utilizes out-of-band messaging to achieve the packet tracing
purpose. The shortcomings of this approach are the following: first, it will bring some additional bandwidth consumption; second, due to the unpredictable routing topology, the
packet loss ratio in MANET is much larger than that in the
Internet; therefore it will need more ICMP packets to guarantee the victim to receive enough ICMP packets.
In [9], Kim and Helmy have proposed a small worldbased attacker traceback (SWAT) approach to trace DoS attacker in MANET. They use traﬃc patterns matching (TPM)
and traﬃc volume matching (TVM) as matching-in-depth
techniques to identify DoS attackers. And then, to eﬃciently
search relay nodes on the attack path, they extend small
world-based contact model [10] and propose a (multi-) directional search method for DoS/DDoS attacker traceback
using contact nodes, which can reduce communication overhead in energy constrained MANETs and increase traceback
robustness against collusion of partial nodes. Note that this
approach is an on-demand approach, that is, when the victim detects DoS attack, it begins to broadcast query packets.
However, firstly, on-demand approaches first consume additional bandwidth and batter power; and secondly, it will take
a longer time to find out the attacker. When the attacker information has been transmitted back to the victim, it is possible that the attacker has already moved to other places [10].

(1)

However, this approach needs additional 72- bit space in
the IP packet header, as we all know that there is no so much
space in the IP packet header. What we can use is only the 16bit identification field, so the author proposed an encoding
approach to compress the 72- bit information into 16 bits.
But the encoding approach needs a mass of computation,
which is not eﬃcient for the portable devices.
ICMP traceback (ITrace) was first proposed by Bellovin
and his colleagues [5]. The basic idea behind ITrace is that
every router should sample a packet with a small probability, copy its content onto a special ICMP packet, add information about the adjacent upstream and/or downstream
routers, and send it towards the same destination as the
original packet. The victim of an attack can then use these

3.
3.1.

ZSBT ALGORITHM FOR MANETS
Differences between Internet and MANET when
tracing a DoS attacker

To trace a remote DoS attacker in MANET is an extremely
challenging task. Two main reasons are as the following. First,
an attacker can spoof a source address, which results that the
victim cannot figure out who is the real attacker only through
the source address. Second, the topology of MANET always
changes, so the packets from the attacker to the victim may
change to diﬀerent paths several times over a short period.
However, the only invariant that can be depended on is that
a packet from the attacker must traverse all the nodes along
the path between it and the victim. Therefore, if each packet
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can record some path information, when the victim receives
enough packets, it can reconstruct the path using the information in those packets. Then the remaining problem is that
what information should be recorded and how to record the
information in each packet. To solve the problem, the edge
sampling method is used in the PPM approach, which can
eﬀectively trace a remote attacker in the Internet.
Enlightened by the PPM approach, the ZSBT algorithm
is proposed in this paper, which can trace the remote DoS
attacker eﬀectively and eﬃciently in MANET environments.
Firstly, we will introduce the diﬀerences between Internet
and MANET when tracing a DoS attacker.
(1) In the Internet, DoS attackers and the victims are always not in the same subnet. The packets sent by the attacker
first need to be transmitted to the gateway and then transmitted by the routers on the path, and finally arrive at the victim.
The gateway is a computer or router which has a fixed IP address. Therefore, the goal of tracing a DoS attacker in the Internet is to find out the subnet where the attacker belongs.
MANET is used mostly in some special situation temporarily. The nodes in MANET can move arbitrarily; therefore, the
relative position between two nodes may change frequently.
Therefore, there is not a fixed gateway for each node. Consequently, the addresses of nodes are always flat addresses. Even
using IP address, they are in the same subnet. In this situation, tracing the DoS attacker in MANET is not to find out
the attacker’s subnet like that in the Internet but the physical
position area.
(2) In the Internet, if the attacker’s subnet has been found
out, the attacker is diﬃcult to displace itself to another subnet
in a short time. And the paths that the packets have passed
through are not changed frequently. In MANET, however, the
paths which the packets have passed through are changed frequently; thus the needed time for tracing the attacker should
be very short; otherwise the attacker may move to another
position before the tracing process is completed.
(3) In the Internet, routers, switches, and PCs have strong
computational abilities, unlimited battery power, and 100 M
bandwidth. The tracing algorithm can be more complex and
therefore more accurate. However, in MANET, the portable
devices have no such advantaged resources and then the tracing algorithm should be rather simple than accurate.
3.2. Reasons for sampling zone
Firstly, two notions are defined. Node path is a path between
the source and destination composed by nodes through
which the data flow passes. Zone path is a path between the
source and destination composed by zones through which
the data flow passes.
In the ZSBT algorithm, a network area is divided into
several zones. The creation and the maintenance of zones
are beyond the research topic of this paper. The partitioning of the network could be based on the simple geographic
partitioning or other clustering algorithms [9]. We assume
that the zone partitioning mechanism is accurate and safe.
One simple approach to obtain the zones is based on geographic partitioning. With the help of GPS, it is possible that
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Figure 1: Node path versus zone path (node path = 9 hops).

a mobile host knows its physical location. Then the node can
determine its zone ID by mapping its physical location to a
zone map. When a packet passes through a node, the node
writes its zone ID instead of its IP address into the packet,
as that in the PPM approach, mainly for the following reasons.
(1) Using the zone, the path length can be restricted in a
relatively small value. For example, in Figure 1, the node path
between the attacker and the victim can be reconstructed
through 9 hops. However, the zone path is through only 5
hops. If the node path between the attacker and the victim
has extended to 15 hops, the zone path is sill through 5 hops
as in Figure 2.
(2) Node path may change frequently due to the mobility
of nodes, but the zone where a node stays will be changed
more slowly; thus the zone path is steadier than the node
path. Moreover, once the zone where the attacker stays has
been found out, it can be considered that in most cases the
attacker cannot leave the zone instantly.
(3) To record IP address, a packet needs to reserve at least
4 bytes. In the PPM approach, if the edge sampling method
is used, the packet needs to reserve 9 bytes to record 2 IP
addresses and one distance field. However, to record zone ID,
1 byte can represent 256 diﬀerent zones. This saves a lot of
space in the IP packet header.
3.3.

ZSBT algorithm

The ZSBT algorithm consists of three processes: initialization
process, zone sampling process, and path reconstruction process. The flow chart of ZSBT algorithm is shown in Figure 3.
Step 1. Initialization process. In the initialization process,
each node constructs a chain and lets the victim be the head.
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Figure 2: Node path versus zone path (node path = 15 hops).

The chain is used to reconstruct the attack path by sorting
the zone ID information in the packets.
When a node receives a packet, if the node is the victim,
the ZSBT algorithm goes to Step 3; the path reconstruction
process is executed. Otherwise, the ZSBT algorithm goes to
Step 2, the zone sampling process is executed.
Step 2. Zone sampling process. In the zone sampling process,
the node writes its zone ID into the node with a probability p
and then forwards the packet. Two static fields, zone ID, and
distance in each packet are reserved. zone ID is used to record
the zone ID of the node on the path. Distance represents the
distance from current node to the victim and its initial value
is set as zero. The concrete actions each node takes are as the
following.
(a) Get its zone ID from the zone map. The method
to divide zones and to get zone ID has been discussed
above.
(b) Engender a random number x from [0,1) and compare it with the marking probabilityp.
(c) If x < p, then the node writes its zone ID into the
zone ID field and writes 1 into the distance field in the
packet, and then forwards the packet.
(d) Otherwise, if the zone ID field is not null, then
the node compares its zone ID with the value in the
zone ID field in the packet. If they are equal, the packet
will be forwarded directly, otherwise, the distance field
will be increased by 1 and then the packet is forwarded.
The zone sampling process is described in Algorithm 1.
Step 3. Path reconstruction process. In the path reconstruction process, the victim reconstructs the zone path from the
attacker to itself using the zone information in each packet.
The detailed steps are as the following.

If the chain is constructed successfully, the victim can
then find out all the zones that the packet has been passed
through. Then the attack response methods can be used.
There are some routing protocols in the MANET that use
multiple paths to transmit packets. If using this kind of routing protocols, only one path is constructed because the victim can launch certain methods to prevent the attack if only
the victim can trace back to the zone where the attacker stays
using one zone path.
Here, it is needed to point out that packets do not sample
the edge between two ordinal zones in the ZSBT algorithm
as in the PPM. The reason is as follows. In the edge sampling method, packets record the IP address of the nodes at
each end of a link, when the victim wants to insert a packet
into the path tree, it can compare the start field in the packet
with the end field of the nodes in the path tree. If the start
field in the packet is equal to the end field of one node,
it means that the packet should be inserted right after this
node. But in the ZSBT algorithm, the path changes all the
time. Thus, even two ordinal zones are recorded; the start
field may be not equal to the end field of any node in the
path chain. Therefore, only the distance field is used to sort
the zone ID.
3.4.

A brief example

Figure 4 is a brief application of the ZSBT algorithm. The
points represent the nodes, the arrows between two nodes
represent the path that the packets have passed through, and
the numbers in this figure represent the zone IDs. The Attacker is in zone 1. It is assumed that the attacker is launching
a DoS attack to the victim through the nodes b->c->d->e->f>g->h->i->j->victim.
Under the above circumstance, each node firstly constructs a chain and lets itself be the head. When receiving a
packet, node b can decide that it is not the destination from
the packet header. Thus, zone sampling process is executed
in the node b. The node b maps its coordinate into the zone
map and gets its zone ID 2. Then the node b writes its zone
ID into the zone ID field in the packet with a probability p.
If the node b decides to mark the packet, it writes its zone
ID into the zone ID field and sets the distance field as 1. If
not, it compares the value of zone ID field in the packet with
its own zone ID. If they are not equal, it increases the distance field by 1. After that, the node b forwards the packet.
The continuous nodes along the path take the same actions
as that of the node b.
When the victim receives this packet with the sampling
zone ID = 2 and distance = 4, it can first decide it is the destination. Then, the path reconstruction process is executed.
The victim itself inserts the value of zone ID into a chain
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Figure 3: Flow chart of the ZSBT algorithm.

according to the value of distance. After receiving enough of
such packets, the victim can reconstruct a zone path between
the attacker and itself. In this example, the zone path is 5->4>3->2->1.
4.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In the following section, we will discuss how many packets
the victim needs to reconstruct a D hop zone path. In an area
whose length is X and width is Y , if it is divided into zones
whose length is x and width is y, then the number of the
zones is (X · Y )/(x · y). Let L be the longest distance that a
packet passes through in the zone, then


L ≤ x2 + y 2 .

n≈

L
≤
l

x2 + y 2
f (tx)

}

else {
if ((w.zoneID != null)&&(w.zoneID != n.zoneID))
w.distance++;
}

}

forward packet w;

(2)

The radio range of nodes is the function of the radio
transmission power. Under the same transmission power,
diﬀerent propagation models will produce diﬀerent radio
ranges. Let tx be the transmission power and l the radio
range, then l = f (tx).
Let n be the number of nodes that will forward the packet
when a packet passes through some zone. Based on (2), n can
be approximately computed as


Marking procedure at node n:
for each packet w{
let x be a random number from [0, 1)
if (x < p) {
write n.ZoneID to w.zoneID;
w.distance = l;

.

(3)

Algorithm 1: Zone sampling process.

Because every node marks the packet with probability p,
the probability for the victim to receive a packet marked by
a d hop away zone is




p(d) = 1 − (1 − p)n (1 − p)n

d−1

(0 < d ≤ D).

(4)

Because the probability of receiving a sample decreases
geometrically as it is the further away from the victim, the
convergence time for this algorithm is dominated by the
time to receive a sample from the furthest route. Then the
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as the following:

Path reconstruction procedure at victim v:
let v be the head of chain c;
for each packet w from attacker {
for each node n in the chain {
if (w.distance == n.distance)
replace n with w;
else insert w.zoneID into c according to w.distance
}



f (p) = 1 − (1 − p)

√

x2 +y 2 / f (tx)



(1 − p)

√

x2 +y 2 / f (tx)

D−1

.
(9)

f (p) is an incremental function of p, so f (p) gets its maximal value when ∂ f (p)/∂p = 0, and at the same time E(x) can
get its minimal value. Therefore we can calculate the value of
p

}

p =1−

Algorithm 2: Path reconstruction process.

5.

√2

x +y 2 / f (tx)

1−

1
.
D

(10)
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Figure 4: An example of the ZSBT algorithm.

expectation of the time can be expressed as
1
E(t) = 

D−1 .
1 − (1 − p)n (1 − p)n

(5)

For convenient computing, it is conservatively assumed
that samples from all of the D nodes appear with the same
likelihood as the furthest node. From the point of the victim,
when it receives a packet, the probability that the packet has
some zone information is larger than




p(i) = D 1 − (1 − p)n (1 − p)n

D−1

.

(6)

From the well-known coupon collector problem, then
the expected number of trials required to select one of each
of D equiprobable items is




E(n) = D ln(D) + O(1) .

(7)

Therefore, the number of packets required for the victim to reconstruct a zone path of length D has the following
bounded expectation:
E(X) =

Simulation environment

Victim

f

d
1

5.1.

4

3

E(n)
P(i)

ln(D)
√2 2
√2 2
<

D−1 .
x +y / f (tx)
1 − (1 − p)
(1 − p) x +y / f (tx)
(8)
From (8), we can discover that the value of E(x) has close
correlation with the value of p. Assume the function of p is

We implemented ZSBT algorithm using the GloMoSim
[5] library. The GloMoSim library is a scalable simulation
environment for wireless network systems, especially for
MANETs. It is designed as a set of library modules, each of
which simulates a specific wireless communication protocol
in the protocol stack. The library has been developed using
PARSEC, a C-based parallel simulation language. Our simulation models a network within a rectangular region. Compared with a square region, the rectangular region can enlarge the average path length; so we can observe the performance on a longer path. One border of the region is 1000
meters, and we can change path length by changing the other
border length. In most experiments unless specified, the network consists of 100 nodes and the mobility model is random waypoint model (pause time 30 s, min speed 5 m/s, max
speed 10 m/s). The nodes in the network are placed uniformly. Radio transmission power is 10 dBm, and the propagation model is TWO-RAY. The packet size is 512 K byte, and
the packet sending rate of DoS attacker is 100 packets per second. We run each scenario three times and the data collected
are averaged over those runs.
5.2.

Simulation results

First, we compare the number of zones with the length of
zone path. In the simulation, the network area is divided into
X × Y zones (X = 4, Y = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). For each kind of zone
division, two nodes whose distance is the longest are selected.
As shown in Figure 5, with the increment of zone number,
the length of zone path is also increasing, but the increasing
rate is slow. When the number of zones varies from 8 to 24,
the length of zone path only varies from 4 to 9. Thus, in a
MANET with large area, we can increase the number of zones
to obtain the attacker’s position more accurately. Also, the
zone path length increases slowly.
The length of zone path is related to the value of X and Y .
Under the same zone number, if X = 1, Y = 8, 12, 16, 20, 24,
the length of zone path must increase. Therefore, when dividing zones, we should make X be equal to Y .
In Figure 6, we compare the length of node path with the
length of zone path when the network area is divided into
16 (4 × 4). Let the length of node path varies from 8 to 15
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hops, as shown in Figure 6, the zone path length only varies
from 4 hops to 7 hops; and the length of zone hops is almost
decided by the number of zones in the area. Therefore, the
path length can be controlled as expected.
Figure 7 compares the number of packets to reconstruct
a zone path between two nodes with diﬀerent probabilities (p = 0.2 and p = 0.05). The distance between the
two nodes varies from 8 to 15 hops. Because the length of
the zone path is always no more than 7 hops, as shown in
Figure 5, the number of packets to reconstruct the zone path
is limited in a small number. From the figure, we can see
that when the probability p is 0.05, the number of packets

Figure 7: The number of packets needed to reconstruct the node
paths with diﬀerent lengths.

needed is no more than 50 packets. When the probability
p is 0.2 the number of packets is no more than 40 packets. What is the optimal value of probability p? According
to (8),
minimal value of E(X)is gotten if p is adopted as
√ the
√
x2 +y 2 / f (tx)
1 − 1/D. Note that x2 + y 2 / f (tx) is approxi1−
mately equal to 2 under our simulation parameters. In addition, the scope of the length of zone path D varies from 3
to 10 at most instances. Based on these two parameters, the
probability p varies between 0.05 and 0.2. Thus in Figure 7,
p is set as 0.05 and 0.2, respectively.
Figure 8 compares the theoretical value and the experimental value of the number of packets needed to reconstruct
a path. The simulation environment of Figure 8 is as follows:
16 (4 × 4) zones, the area of each zone is 250 meters ×500
meters. When the radio transmission power is 10 dBm, and
the propagation model is TWO-RAY, the radio transmission
range is 282 meter. Figure 4 shows that if the network area is
divided into 16 (4 × 4) zones, when the length of node path
varies from 8 hops to 15 hops, the length of zone path varies
from 4 to 7 hops. If these parameters are put into (8), it can
be educed that the number of packets that the victim needs
varies from 20 to 45 packets. The experimental values shown
in Figure 6 varied from 8 hops to 15 hops which drop within
the theoretical bound.
In the MANET, only if the attacker can be traced back
before it moves away from the zone, the victim can launch
certain methods to prevent the attack. Figure 9 shows the relationship between the settling time and the area of the zone.
In the simulation, we choose the random waypoint model
(pause time: 30 s, min speed: 5 m/s, max speed 10 m/s). One
border length is fixed as 250 meters, and the other border
length is 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 meters, respectively. Figure 9
shows that even in the smallest area, the node will stay for
about 60 seconds. Figure 7 shows that the victim needs no
more than 50 packets to reconstruct the path. To launch
a DoS attack, the attacker at least needs to send dozens of
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Figure 9: The relationship between average settle time and area of
Zone.
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packets per second; thus the time needed to reconstruct the
path is short enough before the attacker leaves its zone.
Figure 10 compares the times of the node and zone path
changing within 100 seconds. We recorded the path change
times every 100 seconds. From Figure 10, we can see that if
the zone path is used, the path was changed about 2 times in
100 seconds. However, the node path was changed about 5
times in the same period. This shows that the change of the
zone path is smaller than that of the node path, and it will
provide a more advantageous ability to prevent DoS attack.
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Figure 8: The comparison between theoretical value and experimental value of the number of packets needed to reconstruct a path.
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CONCLUSIONS

0
0

In this paper we have proposed a zone sampling-based traceback (ZSBT) algorithm used to trace DoS attacker in the
MANET environment eﬀectively and eﬃciently. ZBST algorithm uses the zone information of each node sampled by
the packets to reconstruct the path between the attacker and
the victim. In this algorithm, the convergence time is shorter
and the per-packet space is smaller than other algorithms.
Moreover, the accuracy of the attacker’s position can be adjusted by changing the number of zones. The simulation results have demonstrated that this algorithm is capable of fully
tracing most attacks after they send only a few decades of
packets; then the victim can have enough time to take measures to prevent the attacks.
After the attacker has been traced, the victim can take
several measures to prevent the attack. Here, we enumerate
three measures. First, the victim can inform the zone path to
which the nodes belong not to forward or reduce the priority
of packets from the zone where the attacker stays. Second, if
the position-based routing protocol is used in the network,
the victim can send a routing error message to the nodes
in the attacker’s zone. Thus, the attacker will stop sending
packets to the victim because it thinks that the victim is unreachable. Lastly, if there is an out-of-band communication
method, the victim can inform the nodes in the attacker’s
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Figure 10: The comparison of times the node path and zone path
are changed.

zone that one of you has been compromised. Then the nodes
in the attacker’s zone will inspect themselves whether they are
compromised, or will start up their own intrusion detection
system to detect their neighbors.
However, there is a shortcoming of ZSBT algorithm. This
scheme will sacrifice the accuracy of the path for tracing DoS
attackers. One zone may include many nodes and the identification of hackers is not so precise. Although we have proposed several methods to prevent DoS attack in the above
paragraph, the precision of ZSBT algorithm still needs to be
improved.
In the future work, we will not only put our focus on locating the exact DoS attackers zone, but also extend our algorithm to trace DDoS attackers.

Xin Jin et al.
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